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Abstract 
This paper presents two life-cycle models of consumption implementing novel 
assumptions about time preference and subjective time. The goal of this paper is to investigate 
implications of the existence of subjective time to consumption decisions over the life cycle. 
The first model is a model of 'systematic impatience' and implements the assumption of 
increasing subjective time by specifying a time dependent rate of time preference upon which the 
rational consumers in this model maximize lifetime utility. The second model investigates 
consumer behavior in subjective time, or the subjective sense of the actual passage of time. 
Consumers in this model maximize lifetime utility in subjective time. The optimal subjective 
consumption and saving functions are then mapped into real time. Both models are then 
compared to empirical findings on consumption theory. 1 
1 
I would like to thank my mentor and friend Dr. L. Dwight Israelsen whose comments inspired the topic of this 
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1 Introduction 
A child claims that the summer drags forever. His grandfather regrets how fast the 
summer flew by. - Paul Samuelson 
This statement was penned nearly thirty years ago in a seminal article by 
Samuleson (1977), but economists have just barely begun researching the relationship 
between people's perception of time and how this affects their economic behavior. 
Behavioral economics is a nascent field blending economic theory and psychology and is 
becoming a mainstream field in economics. Given that much of economic theory is 
devoted to the study of human and consumer behavior it is surprising that many 
developments in psychology have yet to be integrated into mainstream economic theory. 
This paper implements novel assumptions about people's intertemporal 
preferences and perception of time into the life-cycle theory of consumption. In the first 
model presented in Section 4, younger consumers are more impatient than older ones, i.e. 
the rate of time preference (RIP) changes systematically through time. 
It is an empirical fact that younger consumers consume a larger proportion of 
their income than older ones, this phenomenon is attributed to the 'smoothing' of 
consumption, or the attempt by consumers to maintain a consistent consumption profile 
(this is intimately related to risk aversion and in fact it can be shown that the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution is the inverse of the rate of relative risk aversion see Mas-
Colell 2002) and to the presence of budget constraints. This 'smoothing' phenomenon 
could also be the result of a consumer's perception of time. If time seems to move slower 
for younger consumers, then it is reasonable to assume that younger consumers need 
more consumption to attain a given amount of utility, given that utility is a function of the 
flow of consumption. The first model which I call 'systematic impatience', presented in 
section 4, implements this assumption using a systematic change in the RIP, i.e. future 
consumption per unit of real time is discounted at a higher and higher rate because time 
subjectively seems to be moving faster. 
The second model which I call 'subjective mapping' builds upon findings by 
Samuelson (1977) on subjective time, or the sense of the speed at which time passes. A 
life-cycle model is built where consumers maximize lifetime utility in subjective time and 
the optimal consumption path in subjective time is found. This consumption path is then 
mapped into real time. Four simple functional forms proposed by Samuelson linking real 
and subjective time are used to map the standard optimal consumption and saving 
functions from the standard life-cycle model into real time. The critical assumption of 
this paper is that consumers base their consumption decisions on subjective time and try 
to smooth their consumption in subjective time or alternatively they consume so that the 
marginal utility of money is constant (per unit of subjective time). 
One of the major puzzles in the macroeconomics literature is that though the 
standard life-cycle model of consumption predicts a monotonic consumption path, 
empirical studies have consistently found a robust hump-shaped consumption path 
peaking near the age of 50. This paper shows that with certain values of the parameters 
not varying too greatly from those in the literature, a model of 'systematic impatience' 
can produce hump-shaped consumption profiles. The goal of this paper is not to show 
that the hump is the result of these kind of preferences, but rather that the existence of 
subjective time could have interesting implications for consumption decisions. 
Section 2, lntertemporal Allocation of Consumption, introduces the theory of the 
intertemporal allocation of consumption over the life cycle upon which the models of this 
paper rely. This section provides evidence that consumers consume so that the marginal 
utility of money remain constant over the life cycle, a key assumption made in many 
seminal papers on life-cycle consumption theory. 
Section 3, Time Preference, builds upon the theory of intertemporal allocation of 
consumption adding the important element of time preference. This section presents two 
key parameters used in modeling intertemporal decisions, the RTP and the elasticity of 
inte1iemporal substitution (EIS). This section shows that consumers try to smooth 
consumption over the life-cycle and that the life-cycle model of consumption predicts a 
monotonic path of consumption over the life cycle. 
Section 4, Systematic Impatience, builds the first of two models of this paper in 
which the RTP is time dependent. This differs from the approach taken by Uzawa (1968) 
and Epstein (1983) in which the RTP varies based upon the level of wealth or 
consumption. The RTP in this model varies systematically throughout time and is 
independent of wealth and consumption. The model is then compared to empirical 
findings in the literature. 
Section 5, Subjective Time and Life-cycle Consumption, builds the second model 
which is based upon Samuelson's (1977) findings on subjective time. This model uses the 
findings of the standard life cycle model of consumption and assumes that the consumer 
is maximizing in subjective time. Various functions are presented liking real and 
subjective time and the optimal real consumption and saving functions are found from by 
mapping the subjective functions into real time. The model is then compared to empirical 
findings in the literature. 
2 Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption 
Some of the most important models used in public finance, macroeconomics, and 
consumption theory are optimizing models of the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption. The benchmark or standard model is the life-cycle model suggested by 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Tobin (1967), Yaari (1964) and others and which a 
modem example can be found in Butler (2001). 
We begin by assuming that a consumer has a given utility functionU(x) 
describing their preferences over various goods (for a similar treatment to the following 
see Silberberg (2001) or Mas-Colell (2002)). Given a bundle or vector of the amounts of 




, ••• , x,, )r, and the 
relative prices of these goods, p = (pi,p 2 , ••• ,p,,)r, the consumer will choose the amount 
of each good to maximize their utility function given total income I, i.e. they will choose 
to: 
Maximize U ( x) subject to pr • x = I 
Differentiating the Lagrangian \f'(.x) = U(x)- Jr.,. (pr. x -1) with respect to x 
and Jr., yields the following first order conditions (assuming an interior solution): 
and upon rearranging (1): 
aU(x) . 
----Jr.,p; = 0 for 1 :S z :Sn 
ax; 
T - I p •X = 
aU(x) 






equation (3) shows that the ratio of the marginal utilities of the goods must equal the ratio 
of their prices. 
Geometrically, the optimum is found where the budget set is tangent to the 
indifference curve. Now assume that there are different periods over which the consumer 






, ••• , x
1
,,) denote the goods available to 
the consumer in periodj. Then the previous analysis applies 
with x = (x 1 i, x 12 , ... , x 21 ,x 22 , ••• ), a re-labeling of each good according to the period in 
which the good is consumed. A consumer deciding between good 1 and good 2 will 
fol low the same rule as deciding between good 1 in period 1 and good 1 in period 2, the 
ratio of the marginal utility must be equal to the ratio of the intertemporal price. In this 
framework the consumer as deciding between many goods, where a good available in a 
different period is treated as a different good. 
The standard analysis needs revision when one considers that if the consumer 
saves say X dollars of his income in one period, he can earn (1 + r) • x dollars of income 
for the next period, given an interest rate ofr (the continuous case follows analogously) 
i.e. the consumer can forgo present consumption for future consumption (see Romer 
(2006)). Hence, if intertemporal prices remain constant, an amount q of a good in the 
second period is worth _!J__ of the good in the first period since this is the saving 
l+r 
required at an interest rater to obtain q of the good. This leads to the concept known as 
discounting. 
If the consumer earns an income of Y, in period i and consumes c; worth of goods 
in period i then the intertemporal budget constraint that present value of consumption 
over the life cycle be less than the present value of income over the life-cycle can be 
expressed as: 
i=n C i=n y 
I i .. ~I ii 
i=o (1 + r) i=o (1 + r) 
(4) 
If the consumer has a utility function u(C;) for period i (where period O is the current 
i=fl 
period) and lifetime utility U(c 0 , ... ,c,,) = Iu(c;), such that u'(c;) > 0 and u"(c;) < 0, then 
i=O 
the consumer will choose to: 
Maximize U(c 0 , ... ,c,,)= Iu(c,-) subject to I C; ,. <I Y, 
i=O i=O (1 + r) - i=O (1 + r Y 
Since the marginal utility of consumption is positive, the budget constraint will be 
satisfied with equality and the Lagrangian and first order conditions for this problem are: 
i=II c. i=II Y. 
\f'(co,···,c,,)=U(co,···,c,,)-,1,.cI ' ;-L ') 
i=O (1 + r) i=O (1 + r) 
(5) 
'( A, 
u c,.) = (1 + rY for 0 ~ i ~ n (6) 
I C; i = I Y,- i 
i=o (1 + r) i=o (1 + r) 
(7) 
Equation (6) has an important economic interpretation. Because ,1, is the Lagrange 
multiplier for the budget constraint, it is the value to the consumer of an additional dollar 
of income, therefore it is the marginal utility of money. Equation (6) implies that the 
marginal utility of money must equal the marginal utility of consumption in period 0, 
u ' ( c0 ) = l, and that the marginal value of consumption in subsequent time periods be 
equal to the discounted value of the marginal utility of money, i.e. the present value of 
the marginal utility of money. To see why this must be true assume that the consumer 
decreases his consumption in period j and increases his consumption by (1 +r) the 
decrease in period j+ 1, if the lifetime utility is at a maximum then this marginal change 
should have no effect on total utility (Romer 2006). The marginal utilities in periods j 
and(i+l)fromequation(6)are A . and A andtherefore: 
(1 + r) 1 (1 + r)J+I 
l l l 
---=(l+r)• . =---
(1 + r) i (l + r) J + l (1 + r )1 
Hence it is satisfied for periods 0 ~ i ~ n. This shows that the present value of the 
marginal utility of money must be constant throughout the life-cycle. 
(8) 
Without specifying the form of the underlying utility function, three special cases 
emerge: 
1.) r = 0: In this case the marginal utility of consumption is constant throughout the life 
cycle and this implies that consumption is constant throughout the life cycle, 





2.) r > 0: this implies that u'(c 0 ) > u'(c 1) > ... > u'(c 11 ) and since by assumption 
(9) 
u'(c;) > 0, we conclude that c0 < c1 < ... < c11• This result is expected, since the consumer 
derives the same utility from a given amount of consumption in any time period, it would 
make sense to save income and earn a positive interest and consume in the final period. 
Since u"(c;) < 0, it is not optimal to consume all in the last period, but the amount of 
consumption increases each period. 




) < ... < u'(c,,) and 
These 3 cases provide evidence of a result to be shown in the following section 
that consumers try to smooth their consumption over the life-cycle and in the standard 
framework consumption is either monotonically increasing or decreasing. 
3 Time Preference 
In this section we introduce the concept of time preference. It is obvious that 
people prefer to have wealth now as opposed to later, say in the form of goods or money 
(assuming it can be costlessly stored), because if one has it now one can always save it 
for later and having it now would thus increase one's opportunities (Silberberg 2001). It 
is not surprising therefore that empirical studies show that people are impatient (Chung 
1967). Empirical studies indicate if a person is given the choice between 50$ now and 
100$ a year from now they would take the $50. This implies more than opportunities, but 
preferences. 
To represent these preferences, we would discount not only consumption based 
upon the interest rate but we would also discount utility based upon a rate of time 
preference, p. A lifetime utility function might have the form of 
i=11 u(c,) 
U(co, ... ,c") = L , 
i=o(l+p) 
(10) 
if the rate of time preference is constant over time, or if the rate of time preference differs 
for each period it might take the form of 
~ u(c;) 
U(c 0 , ... ,c 11 ) = ~ J=i 
i=O TI (1 + P,) 
J=O 
(11) 
where p, is the rate of time preference for period i. Using (4) as our budget constraint we 
can see the consumer will try to maximize (10) or (11) subject to (4). For (10) this yields 
(5) as its Lagrangian and a first order condition of (7) and: 
u'(c ) = l • (l + p)' for O ~ i ~ n 
I (l+r)' 
(12) 
For consecutive time periods i and (i+ 1): 
l • (1 + p)i 
u'(c,) (1 + r)i (l + r) 
=-----= 
u'(c,+,) (1 + p)'+' (1 + p) 
A•---
(1 + r)i+l 
(13) 
Equation (13) gives the relationship between the market interest rate and the rate of time 
preference. If the rate of time preference is greater than the market interest rate than 
consumption will be shifted towards the current period. If the interest rate exceeds the 
rate of time preference, than consumption will be shifted towards later periods. We see 
that the growth rate in consumption is constant, i.e. consumption increases, decreases, or 
stays the same monotonically. The standard life cycle model in continuous time leads to 
the same conclusion (see appendix 1). 
In the case where p = r, we notice that c0 = c1 = ... = c,,. This along with (9) 
shows that consumers will try to smooth their consumption over the life cycle. Smoothing 
does not necessarily mean that consumers will try to maintain constant consumption, but 
as already stated that they will try to maintain a constant marginal utility of money, which 
means with well-behaved utility functions, the consumption path will also be well-
behaved (Brumberg). We would only see a dramatic shift in consumption in two adjacent 
time periods if the market interest rate differs dramatically from the rate of time 
preference, otherwise the consumer would not be a utility maximizer since a smoothing 
of consumption would increase utility. 
There is one other parameter that is important in analyzing intertemporal 
consumption decisions, the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution. While the RTP 
determines how much the consumer discounts future utility relative to current utility, the 
EIS detem1ines how willing the consumer is to take advantage of differences in the RTP 
and the interest rate. 
Teclmically, the EIS between periods i and j is the percentage change in the 
relative consumption between those two periods for a one percentage change in the ratio 
of marginal utilities. Since the marginal utilities depend upon the level of consumption, 
one computes the EIS by finding the inverse of the percentage change in the ratio of the 
marginal utilities of two periods for a one-percentage change in relative consumption 
between those two periods. Fom1ally this can be written: 
d(c;/c) 
c;jc 1 dln(c;fc) -----'--~-- = -------=---
d( u( c;) / u( c )) dln(u(c;)lu(c)) 
( 14) 
u(c;)/u(c) 
It can be shown that the inverse of the EIS is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative 
risk aversion, -c. u"(c) (See Mas-Colle! 2002). A common utility function used in the 
11'(c) 
literature is the constant-relative-risk-aversion instantaneous utility defined as: 
u(c(t)) = c(t)'-e for B > 0 
I-0 
(15) 
where 0 is the relative risk aversion and is constant, and the EIS is _.!_ = & . This utility 
e 
function has many nice properties and in the limit as 0 ➔ 0 this function converges to the 
simple function u(c) = ln(c(t)), which has been shown to match empirical observations 




(l+r) c(t+l) ((l+r)J 8 ((l+r)J" 
u'(c1 + 1 )=c(t+Ir0 =(1+p) ⇒ c(t) = (l+p) = (I+p) (l 6) 
Equation (16) leads to the same implications as (13). Studies have shown that 
consumption growth responds relatively little to changes in the real interest rate, which 
implies that the EIS is low (Romer 2006). 
4 Systematic Impatience 
The first model is that of systematic impatience. The consumers in this model are 
impatient in the sense that the RTP is a function of time and varies systematically over 
the life cycle. This fom1 of the RTP is an implementation of the assumption that the 
subjective speed of time is increasing over time. If people view time as passing more 
quickly as they get older, and if they are trying to keep the marginal utility of money per 
unit of real time constant, then they would systematically discount future utility at a 
higher and higher rate. 
It can be shown that for the varying rate of time preference case, using the same 
procedure in the derivation of (13) that: 
J=i 
TI (l+ P;) 
A. _J=_O __ _ 
(l+r/ u'(c;) =------= 
'( ) J=i+I (1 ) u C;+1 TI (l ) + P;+1 + Pi+I 
(1 + r) 
(17) 
Depending on the rates of time preference in each period consumption could be growing 
or shrinking. Consider the case of CRRA utility where 0 ➔ 0 and hence u(c) = ln(c(t)). 
As mentioned previously this form matches 'conventional and empirical evidence' 
(Caliendo 2007). In this case (17) becomes; 
u'(c;) c(i+l) (l+r) 
= = (18) 
The model of systematic impatience shows that consumption increases from 
period i to period i + l if the consumption in period i + l is discounted greater than the 
interest rate. Using (18) and the budget constraint (7) we can solve for the optimal 
consumption path c*(t) given p(t). 
We would expect p(t) to be related to the mapping between subjective and real 
time 0(t), perhaps by some transformation p(t) = g(0(t)) for the reason that as time is 
'speeding up' subjectively the consumer discounts that interval of time at a higher rate. In 
section 5 we present various forms of 0(t) introduced originally by Samuelson (1977) 
including linear, quadratic, logarithmic, exponential, and square root forms. 
We now assume the consumer consumes over 40 years (ages 20 - 60) and assume 
an interest rate equal to 0.05. Figures 1-3 plot relative consumption (consumption divided 
by initial consumption at age 20) for the five mentioned functional fom1s for the rate of 
time preference. Figures 1 plots for p(20) = .03 and p(60) = .07 and Figure 2 plots for 
p(20) = .00 and p(60) = .20. In the life-cycle literature, empirical results find that the 
relative consumption peak is between 1.1 and 1.5 the initial consumption value peaking 
about age 45 to 50. In figure 5 we plot each function for different p(20) and p(60) so as 
to obtain consumption paths that approximate these values. 
As the figures show, with values of p(20) < r and p(60) > r there is a 
consumption 'hump' as our model would predict. The purpose of these graphs is not to 
show that a model of systematic impatience is the primary reason for the consumption 
hump, but that a varying rate of time preference due to the presence of subjective time 
function might greatly affect the shape of the optimal consumption profile. If such a 
subjective time function does exist it could be an important aspect in consumption 
decisions over the life cycle. The next section discusses the subjective time function. The 
existence of a time dependent rate of time preference could imply the existence of 
subjective time if consumers do consume so as to keep the marginal utility of money 
constant per unit of subjective time. 
Figure 1: Relative Consumption Paths with p(20) = .02 and p( 60) = .07 for five 
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Figure 3: Relative Consumption Paths with various values of p(20) and p(60) for 




































20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 ~-







































E .6 :, 
V, 
C: 1.5 0 
(.) .. 1.4 
~ .. 






Quadratic rho 20 = .02 and rho"'= .10 
25 30 35 40 45 50 
~e 
Exponential rho 20 = .04 and rho 60 = 5000 
r. T"I -:-rT r 
25 30 35 40 45 50 
Age 


















20 25 30 35 40 ~-45 
-~ 
50 55 60 
55 60 
55 60 
5 Subjective Time and Life-cycle Consumption 
Everyone has experienced periods where time seems to pass more quickly or 
slowly. Samuelson (1977) defines subjective time as the 'sense of the speed at which, 
subjectively, actual time passes.' Samuelson presents two explanations for the existence 
of a subjective time, the backward look hypothesis and the forward look hypothesis. 
The backward look hypothesis focuses on the duration from birth to the current 
age. Suppose that subjective time is a function of the percentage of marginal experience 
gained compared to total experience received over a lifetime. As one accumulates life 
experience the marginal increase in experience is small in comparison to the total and 
hence leads to a smaller and smaller percentage increase in total experience. Since people 
report a speeding up of subjective time we might suppose that subjective time is a 
function of the percentage increase in experience, that somehow subjective time seems to 
move faster for those who are experiencing a larger percentage increase in life 
experience, i.e. are having more 'new' experiences. 
Another way to look at the backward model is to say that subjective time is a 
function of receiving 'new' experience. Suppose that one receives experiences in life at a 
constant rate taken from a set of possible experiences. We can treat the experiences we 
receive as a random variable with a probability distribution for example it is much more 
probable that one will receive the experience, say, 'late for work', than, say, 'win the 
lottery'. We can treat subjective time as discrete function dependent on the number of 
'new' received experiences, or experiences never received before. As one accumulates 
experience it becomes less and less likely that one will receive new experiences and thus 
subjective time moves faster. This could be modeled as a Poisson process or each time 
interval could be modeled using a hypergeometric distribution. 
Samuelson shows that a subjective time function following the rule that the same 
actual time intervals will have the same subjective time measurement if and only ifthere 
has been the same percentage increase in accumulated experience will look like: 
(19) 
where t0 is the first age of experience accumulation. Hence the subjective time will follow 
a logaritlunic rule. It can be tested if a person did experience subjective time following a 
logarithmic rule, in fact it can be tested if a person followed any subjective time 
(20) 
where 0 ➔ ln(t) as a ➔ 0 (Samuelson 1977). We could also test for the curvature or any 
functional fonn of 0 to see if subjective time speeds up or slows down over the life-
cycle. 
The forward look hypothesis focuses on the duration from the current age to 
death. The age of death is unknown but follows a probability distribution such that the 
probability of death increases with age. Suppose that the subjective time is a function of 
remaining years of life. At age 20 one might have an expected remaining life of 58 years 
and hence there is (58/78) = 78% of ones lifetime remaining and the next year is only 
about 2% of ones remaining lifetime. However, at age 70 one might expect to only life 8 
more years and the next year would be about 12% of that persons remaining lifetime. 
Hence the subjective speeding up of time could be attributed to the increasing percentage 
of one's remaining lifetime per unit of time as one get's older, an increasing 'recognition 
of life as fleeting.' 
A case of the forward look model can be found in the following passage written 
about Evariste Galois, the mathematician who died in a dual at age 21. Eric Bell (1937) 
writes: 
(Galois was) writing against time to glean a few of the great things in his teeming 
mind before the death which he foresaw would overtake him. Time after time he 
broke off to scribble in the margin, "I have not the time; I have not the time. "And 
passed on to the next frantically scrawled outline. 
For Galois, the speeding up of time is apparent as is the speeding up of my own 
subjective time in finishing this paper before its deadline. In the case where death is 
known at age T, Samuelson proposes the following functional form for subjective time: 
r=T 
0(t) = b f (T - t)dt =b(T * t - (1 I 2)t 2 ),0 < t < T 
1=0 








A third explanation for the existence of subjective time could involve the degree 
of mental concentration. In my personal experience, I have noticed that time seems to 
pass faster when I am at a greater degree of mental concentration, for example when 
completing homework assignments or trying something new, and seems to pass slowest 
when my mental concentration is low, for example during soporific meetings and lengthy 
seminars. A common experience amongst students is that during exams one does not 
even recognize the passage of time because subjective time is passing so quickly. Dr. L. 
Dwight Israelsen proposed in a letter to Samuelson that the passage of subjective time 
might be dependent on the activity one is engaged in; physical concentration (brief 
moments of intense physical activity) is related to a slowing of subjective time and 
mental concentration results in a speeding of subjective time. 
I have experienced brief moments of maximum exertion and concentration when 
time seemed to slow tremendously, and activity seemed to be proceeding in slow 
motion ... witness Ted William 's claim that he could see the rotation of the seams 
on the baseball, and his demonstrated ability to see the exact spot on the baseball 
struck by his bat . ... Contrast this to Bell's account of Galois' speeding up of time 
during the night before his death. 
We might posit then that subjective time is speeding up because as people get older their 
degree of physical activity decreases significantly compared to their mental activity. The 
account by some elderly that time seems to pass slowly may attributed to their greatly 
decreased degree of mental concentration. 
In this paper I will not discuss the existence of some tangible or coherent 
subjective time or a notion of subjective time that is 'well-behaved' nor will I discuss the 
conditions for which one can test for the existence of subjective time, both of these 
matters are discussed at length in Samuelson in which he derives axioms that a subjective 
time function must obey (1977). The previous discussion demonstrates the plausibility 
that people observe some fom1 of subjective time. I will now discuss what implications 
the existence of subjective time would have for consumption behavior. 
Suppose that consumers did observe some fom1 of subjective time where 
subjective time passes faster with age. The critical assumption of this paper is that 
consumers will try to keep the marginal utility of money per unit of subjective time 
constant, i.e. consumers are maximizers in subjective time and not in actual time. 
Consider the standard result of the life cycle model derived in appendix 1, that the 
growth rate of consumption is constant (given the EIS, RTP is an exponential function, 
and the interest rate is constant). 
c(t) = c{r- p} 
c(t) 
(al3) 
S · I · c(B) { } . h h 11 . . . uppose we rewnte t 11s as -- = r; r - p , 1.e. t at t e consumer was rea y maxumzrng 
c(0) 
with respect to subjective time and not actual time. To solve for the optimal subjective 
consumption path we rewrite this differential equation: 
c(0) - c(0)(c{r - p}) = 0 (23) 
which has as a set of solutions 
c(0(t)) = ae<c{r-p})B = aeqB 
where the parameter a is chosen so that c(0) satisfies the initial conditions and 
q = &{r - p} a constant. 
(24) 
Let 0(t) be defined as in (19)-(22), substituting these values into (24) we obtain a 
mapping off: c(0) ➔ c(t) and we get (25)- (28): 






Equations (25)-(28) reveal that the consumption growth in real time depends upon the 
consumption growth in subjective time, q. In all cases constant growth in subjective time 
becomes a time dependent consumption growth in real time. For example in the case 
where 0 = ln(t I t0 ), consumption growth is now a function of the inverse of time, if 
consumption was growing at a constant rate q in subjective time, it's growth now 
decreases in proportion with the inverse of time. 
What is interesting is that the growth of consumption in real time has 
approximately the same functional form as the subjective time function. The four 
functional fom1s of the growth of consumption are vastly different, (26) implies growth at 
some power where as (28) implies that growth is exponentially damped. 
(26) - (28) show that the existence of a subjective time function could have 
significant impacts on consumer behavior if they do indeed maximize and make decisions 
based upon some sort of subjective time. We might conclude that since subjective time is 
what consumers observe that it is logical that they do base decisions upon subjective 
time. However we have to remember that while people observe subjective time, they live 
in real time and the passage of real time is how many decisions are based. If consumers 
consume 'per-day' or 'per-month' and not per unit of subjective time than the existence 
of a subjective time function may not have any implications for consumer behavior. 
As previously indicated the existence of subjective time is a refutable matter and 
so it the existence of a time-dependent RTP. Empirical work in the area of the existence 
of subjective time, time-preference, and consumer behavior in subjective time should be a 
very fruitful area of future research. 
Conclusions 
The existence of subjective time or the sense of the speed at which people view 
time as passing could lead to interesting implications for consumer behavior. The model 
of systematic impatience shows that if a speeding of subjective time implies an increasing 
rate of discounting future utility, than optimal consumption profiles could be 'hump-
shaped', or growing ( or shrinking) at a variety of rates dependent on the functional fom1 
of the discounting parameter which logically would have the same form as the subjective 
function of time. 
If consumers did maximize their lifetime consumption according to subjective 
time then the life-cycle model of consumption shows that the optimal consumption path 
in real time is highly dependent upon the functional form the subjective time function. 
Because consumer behavior has the possibility of a high rate of dependence on 
the existence of subjective time, future areas of study that appear to be fruitful are: The 
existence of subjective time, to what degree do consumers base consumption and 
economic decisions on subjective time, and what is the relationship between subjective 
ti me and the rate of time preference. 
Appendix 1 
This appendix presents the derivation of consumption growth in the life cycle 
model found in Butler (2001). It is included so that the reader may have access to the 
derivation of the fundamental growth equations of the life cycle model and also because 
the derivation itself is instructive. 
Let p(t) be a continuous function of time. Let y(t) be the consumers income 
stream, c(t) their consumption stream, and a(t) be the consumers wealth beginning with a 
positive wealth a0 so that a(0) = a0 . We assume that the consumer will retire at time t=T 
with a positive wealth a(T) such that a(T) ~ 0. We let the interest rate, r(t) vary across 
time and also be a continuous function of time. Hence the change in wealth for any 




Q(O) = f p(t)U(c(t))dt 
t=O 
ci(t) = a(t) • r(t) + y(t) - c(t) 
a(0) = a0 
a(T) ~ 0 
This forn1s a standard problem in optimal control theory, the Hamiltonian to this 
optimization problem is given by 
IT(t) = p(t)U(c(t)) + ;L(t){a(t)r(t) + y(t)- c(t)} 
with first order conditions 
an(t) = p(t)U'(c(t))-;L(t) = 0 
ac(t) 
- aIT(t) = i(t) = -;L(t)r(t) 
aa(t) 
ci(t) = aIT(t) = a(t)r(t) + y(t) - c(t) 
8,1,(t) 









U'(c(t)) = A-(t) ⇒ ln(U'(c(t)) = ln(,-1,(t))-ln(p(t)) 
p(t) 
Take the time derivative of this (using the chain rule) equation yields: 
c(t). U"(c(t)) = i(t) _ p(t) 
U'(c(t)) ,-1,(t) p(t) 
Using (a7) and solving for c(t) 
c(t) = U"(c(t)) {- r(t)- p(t)} 
U'(c(t)) p(t) 
Using the definition of the EIS, & , given earlier 
-------rt+- -&t rt+-c(t) _ U"(c(t)) { () jJ(t)}- ( ){ ( ) p(t)} 





In the case where p(t) = e(-pt), then p(t) = p a constant rate of time preference and if 
p(t) 
the EIS and interest rate are also constant then the model reduces to the standard fom1 of 
the life cycle model with constant growth of consumption. 
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